Demos
Demo: CoreGuard blocks a prohibited action before it executes
core.eve_sdk (an EVE(...) object with govern_* methods). That module is not present in the current repository and is not published on any registry, so these snippets raise ModuleNotFoundError if run. They are kept because they show the intended governance flow. For code that runs today, use the published client: pip install eve-coreguard, then from eve_coreguard import CoreGuardClient and call client.evaluate(...), with offline evidence checking via client.verify_evidence(...) or the standalone verify_decision_record. See the CoreGuard integration guide and the Python SDK reference.EVE CoreGuard makes a deterministic policy decision (ALLOW / BLOCK / MODIFY) before a governed action executes. No LLM is in the CoreGuard decision path; the verdict is computed by deterministic policy code. This demo shows a permitted call executing and a prohibited call being blocked with zero side effects.
Everything below uses synthetic fixtures and a recording tool. No production credentials, no network side effects.
Readiness
- EVE SDK core: RELEASE CANDIDATE WITH EXCLUSIONS.
- CoreGuard deterministic evaluation: PILOT_READY (pilot-validated core governance architecture).
- Python SDK
eve-coreguard0.2.10 — release-candidate core client, published on PyPI (pip install eve-coreguard). - This demo runs against the in-process embedded governance facade shipped with the EVE service. The pip client governs via hosted mode (needs a reachable endpoint); embedded in-process evaluation is the service.
Setup
Synthetic identity and a recording tool that appends to a list instead of performing a real side effect:
# demo_coreguard_block.py — synthetic fixtures only
from core.eve_sdk import EVE
IDENT = {"tenant_id": "acme", "principal_id": "agent-1", "session_id": "sess-1"}
executions = [] # recording target — proves whether the tool ran
def create_loan(**kwargs):
"""Synthetic recording tool. Records the call; no real side effect."""
executions.append(kwargs)
return {"loan_id": "L-1001", "status": "created"}
Package facts: Python from eve_coreguard import CoreGuardClient (client, hosted mode). This runnable
demo uses the in-repo embedded facade from core.eve_sdk import EVE so it executes offline
without an endpoint.
Code
eve = EVE(policy="lending_v1", mode="embedded")
# 1) Permitted low-risk call -> ALLOW -> the tool executes.
low = eve.govern_tool_call(
tool="loan_approval",
arguments={"amount": 1000},
context=IDENT,
)
assert low.allowed, "permitted call must be ALLOW"
if low.allowed:
create_loan(amount=1000)
assert len(executions) == 1
# 2) Prohibited high-risk call -> BLOCK -> the tool must NOT execute.
high = eve.govern_tool_call(
tool="loan_approval",
arguments={"amount": 500000},
context={**IDENT,
"credit_score": 480, "debt_to_income": 0.9, "employment_verified": False},
)
assert not high.allowed, "high-risk call must be BLOCK"
# Do not call the tool on a BLOCK verdict.
assert len(executions) == 1, "blocked call must cause zero tool side effects"
print("decision:", high.action, high.reason_codes)
print("evidence certificate present:", high.certificate is not None)
Expected decision
| Call | Verdict | Tool executed |
|---|---|---|
low-risk loan (amount=1000) |
ALLOW | yes (1 recorded execution) |
high-risk loan (amount=500000, low credit) |
BLOCK | no |
The verdict field reports BLOCK, with policy-derived reason_codes. certificate.llm_in_decision_path == false.
Expected evidence
The BLOCK decision produces a signed decision-evidence record bound to the decision:
{
"action": "BLOCK",
"reason_codes": ["..."],
"decision_id": "...",
"certificate": {"content_hash": "...", "signature": "kms-ecdsa-p384-...", "canon": "jcs-1",
"llm_in_decision_path": false}
}
ECDSA P-384 is used in production configuration; an HMAC-SHA256 fallback is symmetric and not independently verifiable.
Verification command
from core.eve_sdk import verify_evidence
v = verify_evidence("decision", high.certificate, expected_tenant="acme")
assert v["valid"], v.get("reason")
print("verify:", v["valid"]) # -> True
verify_evidence proves the evidence is authentic and unaltered; it does not attest the
correctness of the underlying decision.
Zero-side-effect assertion
len(executions) == 1 after both calls: only the ALLOW call ran the tool. The BLOCK verdict
never invokes create_loan. The recording list is the independent witness that no side effect
occurred on BLOCK.
Cleanup
executions.clear() # in-memory fixture; nothing else to tear down
No files, network calls, or external state were created.
Limitations
- CoreGuard is PILOT_READY, not production. The zero-LLM property applies to the governance verdict only; the governed application may still use LLMs.
- The pip client SDK reaches CoreGuard via hosted mode (needs an endpoint); embedded in-process evaluation runs inside the EVE service.
- On a BLOCK, EVE decides — it cannot execute the tool on your behalf. Enforcement depends on
your code honoring the verdict (call the tool only when
allowedis true) or routing through a gateway/sidecar for hard enforcement.